The "Arab Spring" Is Actually the “Muslim Brotherhood Spring”

By Barry Rubin

It’s always fascinating to read the work of genuine Arab moderates (or that of non-Arab Muslims) to see how much it differs from the Western-celebrated false moderates and radicals so often prominently featured in the mass media and academia. Indeed, people like the following writer can never be found as heroes of the official West because they tell the inconvenient truths about the Middle East.

Consider a young Saudi named Mshari al-Zaydi. He is the opinion page editor of Al-Sharq al-Awsat, the best Arabic newspaper, where this article first appeared. It was then reprinted on the website of al-Arabiyya, the UAE alternative to the radical Qatari al-Jazira. Funny, how the anti-Western al-Jazira is lionized by the West while al-Arabiyya is ignored.

Al-Zaydi’s article is entitled, “The Muslim Brotherhood Spring,” an apt name for what is otherwise called the “Arab Spring.” One need merely quote what al-Zaydi writes:

“Today, those who supported the Egyptian revolution are in a state of shock with regards to the domination of the political arena by religious parties and currents….What we are seeing is a political Islamist tsunami….

“In Libya, we find [religious] fundamentalists of all backgrounds, from those who have taken up arms, to those who are making speeches and giving sermons, inside the country and abroad, not to mention figures like Ali al-Salabi.

“While in Tunisia, the [Islamist] al-Nahda party, and supporters of its leader Rashid Ghannouchi, are in the political ascendency. As for Yemen, we have the Islah [Reform] party, not to mention the Muslim Brotherhood and the Huthi rebels.

“I recall how many Arab writers at the beginning of this year…prophesied that what we were witnessing were uprisings staged by non-political civilians and youth, and claimed that not a single radical or ideological slogan was chanted in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, or any other Arab public square.

“They said that this proves that the Arab regimes were lying to the world–and to the political elites who champion the idea of the civil state–when they said that should their regimes be toppled, this would result in Islamists and religious fundamentalists coming to power. Those who supported the Arab Spring always countered that this was nothing more than a lie fabricated by these regimes to remain in power, and that the Arab Spring youth had proved their mettle and their belief in civil values.

“Now, these same well-intentioned writers – or at least many of them–have returned to warn against the Arab Spring being hijacked and despoiled. They have expressed their confusion about the presence and popularity of these radical Islamists who are overwhelming the political scene, and are asking: where did the Facebook youth go?

“These writes are perplexed. Some have claimed: this situation [hegemony of the Islamists] is the work of the remnants of the former regime that have reformed their ranks and are working to abort the revolution. Whilst others have claimed that there are foreign hands tampering with the revolution and attempting to alter its course, however they then go on to disagree as to just which foreign party is responsible for this. Is it Iran or Israel? The US or Saudi Arabia? Perhaps it is China, or maybe even the Comoro Islands? Who knows?….

“Of course those same writers and media figures were not voicing such opinions at the beginning of the year. In fact, they were attacking anybody who expressed any suspicion or skepticism regarding the outcome of these chaotic uprisings!…

“What guarantee do we have that these religious fundamentalists will relinquish power once their failure is revealed, particularly as all the elements of power will be in their hands? Did this work out in Iran which has been ruled by Khomeneist disciples for over 3 decades?

“Rather than expressing shock and surprise, the question that should be asked is: how should we deal with this critical period which should be called the Muslim Brotherhood Spring, not the Arab Spring?”

The Western establishment pretends to be “pro-Arab” and “pro-Muslim” while subjecting these peoples to a terrible tyranny and decades of socio-economic stagnation and terrible bloodshed.

As I have repeatedly explained, understanding these issues is not based on being liberal or conservative, left or right, Jew or Muslim, American or Saudi. The struggle is between revolutionary Islamists who want to impose a repressive Sharia state and those Western useful idiots who help them against everyone else.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction will be published by Yale University Press in January. Latest books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at http://www.gloria-center.org and of his blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com

The "Arab Spring" Murdered with Bullets, Hijacked Amid Bloodstains, Protected By Obama

"The only thing necessary for evil to triumph in the world is that good men do nothing." --Edmund Burke

By Barry Rubin

And if the good men are murdered by the forces of political evil than they certainly cannot do anything. Hence, the outcome is assured.

Thus, the "Arab Spring" has just been murdered with bullets and hijacked amid bloodstains. Here is the list of countries in the Middle East area currently ruled by Islamists: Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey. Syria will probably join them soon. Qatar has a pro-Islamist policy. Morocco technically has an Islamist government though the king neutralizes it in practice. Saudi Arabia is ruled by a strict Islamic regime but opposes the revolutionary Islamists though its money often spreads their doctrines elsewhere. Everyone is being forced into Sunni or Shia Islamist camps, backing radical forces in other countries so that their religious allegiance can conquer.

In this situation, only in Tunisia could the non-Islamists win fairly conducted elections. But an election isn't fair if one side uses violence to ensure its victory and its ability to transform the country into a social-political dictatorship afterward.

I know that whenever I write an article on Tunisia it will have fewer readers than other topics. That’s understandable from the standpoint that Tunisia is a small country with little international impact and limited U.S. interests.

Yet Tunisia was the country where the “Arab Spring” began. And Tunisia is going to be the place where the Middle Eastern equivalent of the Spanish Civil War will be fought. In other words, it is the only place where moderate and “secularist” forces are going to fight and the only country where the moderates have a majority of the population--though not a majority of the guns--behind them.

Given that bellwether factor, they have just suffered a massive defeat which is simultaneously a major victory for the Islamist forces.

Briefly, what people who believe the Arabic-speaking world is heading toward democracy don’t understand is that they have helped unleash forces quite willing to engage in violence and that will not stop until they’ve achieve a total triumph. It’s sort of like Pandora who opened the box to unleash its spiritual whirlwinds and said, “This ought to be interesting!”

That’s why the assassination of Choukri Belaid is so important. He was leader of the Democratic Patriot party and a leader of the Popular Front opposition coalition. While the story will be obscure in the West it is devastating for Tunisia, the Arab liberals, and the future of the region. Belaid was the single most outspoken and determined anti-Islamist leader in the country, and indeed the most important openly anti-Islamist politician in the entire Arabic-speaking world. He wasn’t the only moderate politician in Tunisia but he was the main one who rejected Islamist rule and warned against Islamist intentions.

And how did the Islamist-dominated coalition react? The moment the leading opposition figure—the man around whom an anti-Islamist coalition might have been built following the next elections--was murdered it called for new elections.

Get it? The Brotherhood’s moderate coalition partners didn’t want elections now. And if you eliminate the tough moderate those remaining may be more pliable about caving in. It was quite conceivable that the non-Islamists would get a majority in the next elections--as they did in the previous one. But a majority divided among four parties isn't enough. Last time, the moderate parties got 60 percent but their disunity allowed the largest single party, the Brotherhood, to take control of the government coalition with only 40 percent of the vote.

But a man like Belaid might have forged a moderate coalition government that would keep the Brotherhood out of power. In other words, though he led only the fourth largest party, Belaid was the key to forcing the Brotherhood out of power by convincing the four moderate parties to work together against the Islamist threat. His elimination isn't just a crime, its a political strategy.

As I predicted a few days ago, destroying the left is going to be the Islamists’ priority and Tunisia is the only country where the political left poses a danger to them. Elsewhere it is too weak, confined to isolated individuals and publications.

Some decades ago, the killing of a left-wing leader by what Marxists would have called “clerical-fascist” forces would have provoked an outcry from the Western left. Nowadays, they don’t even blink—as we also saw in Iran--unless some misdeed can be blamed on the United States or Israel.

While Belaid stood firm, the two other main moderate parties were willing to try working with the Muslim Brotherhood, Belaid said "no" and warned--just as we have--that the Islamists were determined to create a dictatorship. He was the man to kill, an event which also has an intimidating effect on the other moderates.

As Belaid's brother put it: the killing was "a clear message to Tunisians....Shut up or we kill you."
I don’t think the assassination was the result of a high-level conspiracy and especially not from the Brotherhood itself. Most likely, it was done by a small Salafist group.

But that’s the point. The Obama Administration views the Brotherhood as the bulwark against the Salafists, In fact, it is their big brother, often using the Salafists as shock troops to attack Western embassies, oppositionists, secularists, moderates, churches, and women who seek equality.

Ideally when the leader is going to be murdered the masses stand up and say, "I am Spartacus." In reality, particularly in countries with anti-democratic political cultures, it doesn't happen that way. Even if the four moderate parties do well in elections they still have to cooperate, having to face a wave of Salafist violence, too.

Now if the Tunisian army were to stage a coup that would make a difference. But what do you think would happen if the generals went to the U.S. embassy and asked for America's support to overthrow the Brotherhood? In Egypt, we do see a sort of uprising against the regime. But without the army's support it doesn't seem to have a chance of taking power. Still, one must keep an open mind and see what happens.

Yet few in the West will be aware that Belaid is the second moderate opposition leader killed in Tunisia during the last three months in Tunisia. During decades of Arab nationalist dictatorship Tunisia-style, murder was rarely employed.

The Islamists have no such inhibitions. They are the people to be afraid of. Consider that in Libya, the most obvious American client in the Arabic-speaking world, there’s no hint of arresting anyone for the murder of the U.S. ambassador and three American officials which happened five months ago! Don’t hold your breath.

A similar strategy to what has just happened in Tunisia took place in Lebanon a few years ago, where the Syrians and their Hizballah and other local allies murdered opposing parliamentarians, journalists, and judges until they came close enough to a legislative majority and to intimidating critics that they won the election and currently form the Lebanese government.

And what about Syria where Islamists are headed for power with America’s blessing? Or Washington where the main lobbyist for supporting the Brotherhood is becoming head of the CIA? And what about Egypt where dozens of demonstrators have been murdered by the Muslim Brotherhood regime as the West still proclaims that government's democratic credentials, the international institutions negotiate the supply of billions of dollars and the United States sends advanced fighter planes and tanks as gifts?

The tide is only going in one direction and Obama’s policies are raising, not lowering, these sea levels.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Tunisia: There’s Still Hope for Democracy Because The Majority Doesn’t Want Islamism

By Barry Rubin

Is Tunisia, the Arab world’s historically most moderate country in social and intellectual terms, headed for Islamism or some kind of difficult but democratic future? I want to rethink my conclusions on this point. Or is it just the timeline that needs to be extended?

It should be stressed that Tunisia has more prospects for achieving democracy and avoiding radical Islamism than do Egypt or Libya. In Egypt, 60 percent of the vote was obtained by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists in the first round, with claims of up to 75 percent in the second round. Excluding Christian voters–who presumably didn’t vote for Islamists–that means somewhere between two-thirds and 80 percent of Egyptian Muslims support radical Islamist parties. Only the army, which is eager to suppress moderates but would rather make deals than fight the Islamists, stands in the way of radicalization. In Libya, the political situation is far less clear but radicals have the guns while tribal and regional conflicts are likely to promote conflict and extremism.

In Tunisia, though, there is a strong base for moderation. Incidentally, Tunisia is the only country where there is a European-style left, in keeping with Tunisia’s Mediterranean orientation and relative openness to Western influences. Tunisia’s new interim president Moncef Marzouki, promises a moderate republic. But the real defense against an Islamist dictatorship, even an elected one, is that the majority doesn’t want it and those people are unlikely to change their minds. Incidentally, I wonder if one difference in Tunisia was that many women voted against the Islamists given the more modern outlook and long history of relatively more rights than elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world.

It is easy to identify what went wrong in the Tunisian electoral process: the ridiculous divisions among the anti-Islamist forces. Of 217 seats, the Islamist party, al-Nahda, won 89. What about the other 128? The answer is that basically all but a half-dozen seats—that went to pan-Arab nationalist or far leftist parties—went to moderate anti-Islamist forces, social democratic or liberal parties.

In short, there is a strong potential base in Tunisia–unlike almost every other Arabic-speaking country–for a real alternative to an Islamist transformation of the society. Still, the Islamists are ruling and will be able to do a lot to create the kind of society they want. The question is: How much?

There are some other important things favoring Tunisia. It is not important in international affairs and there is not a real passion there for foreign adventures, other than to refuse any dealings with Israel. The country and population is small enough that Western aid and efforts might have a real effect in raising living standards and helping civil society develop.

Finally, the very size of the secular-oriented forces and the weakness, relative to Egypt and Libya, of even more radical (Salafist) Islamist forces means that the Tunisian al-Nahda party has to be cautious. One thus doesn’t have to believe in the moderation of al-Nahda or of its rather slippery leader, Rached Ghannouchi, to think the Islamists won’t push too hard for transformation. Consequently, it is conceivable that al-Nahda might be voted out of office in future and have to accept that verdict.

It isn’t that Ghannouchi and his crew are actually moderate though he plays the role better than his counterparts in most other countries. As one Tunisian liberal, blogger Lina Ben Mhenni, puts it: ”On the outside it looks like a moderate party, but the truth is different.”

When confronted with his documented radical political views and even genocidal statements toward Israel, he simply claims these are Zionist fabrications. And of course, like his Egyptian and Palestinian counterparts, he doesn’t have to worry about the Western mass media exposing him. But he does have to worry a bit about Tunisians’ horror at the Islamists’ ascension.

The Tunisians, however, have even more to worry about. One factor that’s often too underestimated in Western analyses of the post-“Arab Spring” societies is that of intimidation and unofficial violence. This has reached huge proportions in Egypt where both criminal anarchy and armed Salafists have run rampant. There is also the repression of the 10 percent who are Christians. In Egypt, it won’t matter if there’s no law against women dressing as they please or Christians repairing churches if anyone who tries to act in that manner is assaulted.

There’s been some effort at intimidation in Tunisia, notably at one university where the demand for women to be veiled has led to a couple of riots. But the situation might be better there. Precisely because al-Nahda needs to avoid antagonizing a large sector of the populace—something that doesn’t really apply elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking world—it might rein in vigilantism. Tunisian anti-Islamists can mount large demonstrations in support of human rights and civil liberties, something unthinkable in other Arabic-speaking countries.

Remember that in Egypt the “moderate” demonstrations that are being repressed by the military are against the army, not the Muslim Brotherhood. The reformers either live in a dreamworld–in which a faster transition to Islamist rule will solve their problems–or they are just too afraid (one understands why) to take on the Brotherhood and Salafists.

Can the Tunisian moderates unite? It won’t be easy. They are divided by the egos of their leaders and to some extent by the policies they espouse. Their substantive differences are within the basic Western spectrum, far smaller than the difference between their vision and that of the Islamists. Moreover, to achieve power, glory, and money (through patronage) some would prefer to make a deal with al-Nahda rather than each other.

The Turkish case has shown that the anti-Islamists can be such incompetent politicians and so prone to personal ambitions and bickering as to throw away their country. In Lebanon, Hizballah has been able to turn non-Islamist, non-Shia (even Christian) political forces into satellites. So it is quite possible that the Islamists will outmaneuver everyone else in Tunisia as well.

Still, in Tunisia the Islamists may well have reached their upper limit of popular support. The majorityknows what it wants, and it isn’t Islamism. Finally, and this should be taken seriously, al-Nahda needs a real coalition to rule, something the Egyptian Islamists will only do for show.

How much does this matter for the region? Not at all. Whether or not Tunisia succeeds isn’t going to affect any other country. It might even provide cover for Islamists to point to al-Nahda and claim that they, too, are “moderate.” Yet, of course, it is quite important for the Tunisians.

This is also significant for Western policy. When European officials asked me what they can do to help post-“Arab Spring” regimes, I’ve suggested two main projects: concentrate on Tunisia and also on Jordan, where aid and involvement might do some good.

A collapse of the Jordanian regime, which I don’t expect but the country does have grave economic problems, would make Egypt look like a picnic. Jordan has suffered a huge setback since prospects that the Gulf Cooperation Council might add it as a member and provide $1 billion in aid have now evaporated overnight.

At any rate, Tunisia, the country where the “Arab Spring” started, might still have a chance. The way things are going, it could be one of the few survivors in the current Islamist political tidal wave in the region, and even that small exception cannot be taken for granted.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books include Israel: An Introduction (Yale, 2012); The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).
 

Sunni Versus Shia: The Middle East’s New Strategic Conflict

By Barry Rubin


Of course, conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims are not at all new, but it is indeed new as a feature on the regional level in modern times. After all, as long as there were secular-style regimes preaching an all-inclusive Arab nationalist identity, differences between religious communities are subordinated. Once there are Islamist regimes, theology becomes central again, as it was centuries ago.

However, no one should misunderstand the situation. This is fundamentally a struggle for political power and wealth. When Sunni and Shia states or movements battle they are acting as political entities with suck strategies, tactics, and goals.

The growing power and influence of Iran’s Islamist regime posed a tremendous problem for Arabs Sunni Islamists. They generally did not like Iran because it was Persian and Shia, yet it was the only Islamist game in town. Thus, Arab Sunni Islamist Hamas became an Iranian client. The Iran-Iraq war reflected these antagonisms, as best seen in Iraqi propaganda. Yet Iraq’s regime was also able to keep the Shia majority there under control.

Saddam Hussein’s removal by a U.S.-led international intervention opened up the question of confessional relations in Iraq. The Arab Shia were inevitably going to win any election, given their three-to-one advantage over the Sunni and the Kurds opting out for what is, in effect though not name, their own state in the north. Despite the terrorist, anti-American, and al-Qaida elements of the Sunni insurgency, it was essentially a last-ditch attempt by the Sunnis to reclaim power. It failed and while violence continues, the main Sunni emphasis will be on negotiating the best possible division of power.

In Lebanon, the Shia triumphed too, led by Hizballah and provided aid by Syria and Iran. But all of this was prelude to the year 2011. The “Arab Spring” was an overwhelmingly Sunni affair, their own equivalent in some ways of Iran’s 1979 revolution. Only in Bahrain, where they were repressed, did the Shia take the offensive.

Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya all had Sunni insurgencies against Sunni Arab governments. The situation in Syria is far more complex with an Alawite non-Muslim regime that pretends to be Shia Muslim and is allied with Iran, opposed by a variety of oppositionists. Nevertheless, in this context, the upheaval is a Sunni-led (though far from just Islamist) revolt against a “Shia” regime.

Here’s the bottom line: Sunni Arab Islamists no longer need Iran or even Turkey because they now have their own power. What is likely to emerge is at least a loose Sunni Arab and largely Islamist-flavored bloc consisting of Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Libya, and Tunisia along with the Muslim Brotherhood elements in Jordan and Syria.

The key element here is the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that doesn’t like Shia Muslims in general and Iran in particular. Little events, like Brotherhood guru Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s support for the Sunni regime in Bahrain against the Shia opposition, show the direction of their thinking. The even more radical Salafists—a term now used for the small revolutionary Islamist groups, are even more anti-Shia. One factor here is the continued unwillingness of the majority of Arab states to welcome Shia-ruled Iraq into their ranks. Iraq is not going to become a satellite of Iran. It certainly feels more comfortable in a Shia bloc but will probably continue to be relatively uninvolved in regional affairs.

Note, too, that to a large extent this situation leaves the Palestinian Authority as an orphan. While it can depend on general Arab, Iranian, and Turkish support, it has no regional patron and Hamas is the group enjoying the Sunni Islamists’ warm support. This, of course, encourages the Palestinian Authority’s (Fatah’s) alliance with Hamas while also weakening its leverage toward that Islamist partner. (And that means a continued disinterest in negotiating with Israel, much less reaching a negotiated solution with it.)

Thus, despite appearances, 2011 was a defeat for Iran and Turkey because Sunni Arab Islamists are far less receptive to Tehran’s influence and view it as a rival, while Arab Islamists don’t want leadership from Turks either.

Can these blocs unite effectively against the United States, the West or Israel? In a word: No. Their power struggles for regional power and for control of individual states (Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and to a far lesser extent Iraq) will keep them in conflict. Even on the anti-Israel consensus they will each seek to exploit it for their own interests.

By the same token, however, the hope for moderation is minimal. In a region when regimes and movements are competing to prove their militancy and loyalty to a radical interpretation of Islam, nobody is going to want to make peace with Israel. And regimes will only work with the United States I they feel that America can and will protect them, a rather forlorn hope with an Obama Administration eager to make friends with Islamists. There is also another aspect to this Sunni-Shia rivalry, the formation of blocs, the competition in militancy, and the battle for control of individual states. The region will continue to waste lives, time, and resources in political strife as the lure of ideology and power rather than pragmatism and economic productivity still rule even if the old regimes have fallen.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books include Israel: An Introduction (Yale, 2012); The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).  

The Big Split in the Revolutionary Islamist Movement: Sunni and Shia Blocs Emerge

By Barry Rubin


A development of huge importance is happening in the Middle East, equivalent perhaps to the Sino-Soviet conflict’s effect on the Cold War era: the division of revolutionary Islamists into separate Sunni and Shia camps.

Of course, there have always been tensions and conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims, notably bloody fighting in Iraq. Islamists often attempt to portray this as a Western conspiracy but most Muslims know it is a historical reality within Islam.

Iran’s regime tried, with some success, to bridge this gap, becoming patron of Sunni Hamas and majority Sunni Syria. Similarly, the non-Muslim (it pretends otherwise but most Muslims know the truth) Alawite-dominated Syrian regime claims to be Shia and sold itself for a while to Sunnis as a cross-confessional champion of resistance against Israel and the West.

The Sunni-Shia fighting in Iraq did not break this attempt to forge cross-confessional Islamist alliances. But now two other events have done so. The most important is the Syrian revolution. Everyone must take sides. Iran and Hizballah, itself a Shia group, sided with the Syrian regime. Egypt’s increasingly powerful Muslim Brotherhood and the Brotherhood-spawned Hamas are against the Syrian regime, hoping that their fellow Muslim Brotherhood allies will take over in Damascus.

Those who don’t understand this situation think that choosing against the Syrian regime is some proof that the Turkish stealth Islamist government is moderate. No such thing. It is simply taking the Sunni side, also hoping that a congenial Islamist state will emerge as an even closer ally than President Bashar al-Assad has been for them.

The second event was the Egyptian revolution. Finally, the Brotherhood has the hope of establishing a Sunni Muslim Islamist power. Possibilities also exist for a Sunni Islamist regime in Libya and at least a stronger Islamist political presence in Tunisia. Who needs Iran when you have your own Islamist or at least moving-toward-Islamism state?

Make no mistake. Both Islamist blocs hate the West and want to expel its influence from the Middle East and expand their own power by overthrowing additional regimes. Both Islamist blocs hate Israel and want to wipe it off the map. Neither group will be moderate in any way. But with inevitable competition, there will be less cooperation. Once again, the dream of unity ends in quarrels. There are now zero caliphates. In future, there are more likely to be two than just one.

How will this competition manifest itself?

Egypt: Since there is no Shia option there, Iran will try to get along with Egypt as a state, whether it is more Islamic and anti-American or becomes dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood will see Egypt—just as the Arab nationalists once did—as the rightful leader of the Arabic-speaking world. Better Egypt-Iran relations are certain; an Egypt-Iran alliance is unlikely.

Palestinians: Competition over being the patron of Hamas. Egypt and the Brotherhood will win that one. The Palestinian Authority, lacking any reliable Arab ally—since the Saudis are still angry about Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein’s aggression back in 1990—will be weakened in its competition with Hamas. The PA’s response? Staying intransigent so it cannot be outflanked by the Islamists.

Syria: If the regime survives, it will align with the Shia, if it falls, the question is who takes over but it will certainly leave the Iranian bloc. An Islamist Syria would align with Egypt. While antagonistic toward Hizballah—Syria’s Lebanon policy would be very interesting—it would back Hamas completely

Lebanon: Currently, the Shia Islamist group, Hizballah, and other clients of Iran and Syria prevail. Sunni Islamism has been weak in Lebanon. Perhaps the Sunnis would build up Sunni Islamist groups and perhaps even align with the moderate, non-Islamist Sunni forces that oppose Hizballah-Syria hegemony?

Iraq: While being cautious in foreign involvements, the Iraqi government will tend toward the Shia side, knowing well that too much of a tilt could reopen internal conflicts. How’s this for a perfect example of how Middle East politics transcends Western rationality: the Syrian regime has supported massive Sunni Muslim terrorism against Iraq, its government, and the Shia majority. Now, however, the Iraqi government supports the survival of that Syrian regime because it is part of the Shia bloc! Indeed, high level Iraqi officials are publicly suggesting the Syrian revolution is a result of Saudi and Israeli manipulation.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html?_r=1 And another bizarre Middle East example: Iraq will manage a situation in which its two main allies are the United States and Iran.

Gulf kingdoms: The Saudis already play the game this way, viewing Iran as a Shia threat and protecting the smaller Gulf Arab states (notably Bahrain) against Shia reform or revolutionary movements. The Saudis already take an anti-Syria stance and oppose Syria-Hizballah-Iran (Shia) hegemony in Lebanon. They are also taking Jordan under their umbrella. These countries will not join an Islamist bloc but will view the Shia as the main threat.

What does this mean for the West and Israel? Given both Islamist blocs’ hostility, there’s no possibility of working with one against the other. U.S. policymakers might make that error, however, given their soft line on the supposedly moderate Brotherhood. That’s a danger. What U.S. policy should do is support all the anti-Islamist forces, but the moving vans will have to pull up to the White House before that happens.

The Islamists will be weaker, subverting each other’s attempts to take over or control various countries and movements. Yet growing sectarianism can also lead to really nasty communal massacres of Muslims by Muslims, as has already happened in Iraq. Syria is the place to watch for that development.

Finally, in competing to show their militancy and effectiveness in backing terrorism, the rate of attacks by both sides could well increase. Trying to prove that one is the “proper” Islamist side representing “authentic” Islam will also likely lead to reckless risk-taking, which a naïve West—assuming everyone wants to be a moderate and acts “rationally” according to their own definition—will be ill-equipped to handle.

A new phase in Middle East history is opening that the West must evaluate and act on. Since, of course, Western governments haven’t even caught up to the last two stages--revolutionary political Islamism is a huge strategic threat and it is best equipped to take advantage of the “Arab Spring”—they are unlikely to comprehend this one either.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is http://www.gloria-center.org. His articles published originally in places other than PajamasMedia can be found at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com   

Obama’s Middle East Policy Will Collapse In September

By Barry Rubin

Prediction: In September, President Barack Obama’s Middle East policy blows up in his (and our) face(s). It’s totally obvious and yet no one is focusing on it.

I’m not referring to the Palestinian Authority’s bid for unilateral independence at the UN. I’m referring to the Egyptian parliamentary election.

It is totally obvious that in that election Egypt will elect a radical, anti-American, hate-Israel parliament which will then write the country’s new constitution. This is a turning point in Middle East history. And Obama is unaware of it. Quite the contrary, he declared in his State Department speech that everything is great with the “Arab spring.” Nothing can go wrong. It is the expression of a yearning for prosperity and freedom.

The Arab spring began when a frustrated man in Tunisia set himself on fire.

It will now move to the new phase: the whole Middle East will be set on fire.

Is that alarmist? Not at all, except in the sense that when one sees a fire he sets off the fire alarm.

Don’t be distracted by the question of whether Islamists will have a majority or the even narrower question of whether the Muslim Brotherhood will have a majority.

There WILL be a radical majority, there MIGHT be an Islamist majority, there won’t be a Muslim Brotherhood majority but it will ALMOST CERTAINLY be the largest single party.

Why do I say this? Well, Amr Moussa, who isn’t an Islamist and is Egypt’s most popular and important Egyptian politician says so.

There is no sign—no sign—that the moderates are organizing serious parties. Instead of getting to work, they’re complaining. Meanwhile four radical, anti-American, passionately anti-Israel forces are organizing:

--The Muslim Brotherhood, which should get one-third or more of the seats and is contesting half of them, obviously in the districts where it has the best chance of winning.

--Smaller and even more radical Islamist parties (referred to as Salafists) who could form agreements with the Brotherhood so that they won’t hurt each other’s chances.

--Left-wing neo-Marxist parties.

--Radical nationalists.

There will probably be a number of independents who will be courted and won over by one of these blocs.

Imagine the day after that election. What will the mass media say? What will the American politicians say?

--That they were wrong about the Egyptian revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood?

--That by helping to bring down the old regime, U.S. policy foisted a disaster on the region and on its own interests?

--That by celebrating how great the “Arab Spring” is and refusing to acknowledge the real threats and problems, Obama made catastrophic errors.

--That his policy has led to many advances for America’s enemies?

--That Israel is in a far worse strategic situation and certainly can’t and shouldn’t make any more concessions?

--That the Islamists are emboldened and thus both Hamas and the radicals who run Fatah are taking an even harder line?

--That the loss of faith in America by its Arab allies is now undeniably clear and they are scrambling to make their own deals with Iran and other extremists?

--That there is a real possibility of a war in which Egypt either joins directly or backs Hamas? Imagine, Egypt stays “neutral” but nobody stops thousands of Egyptian volunteers from crossing into Gaza to fight or even across the Egypt-Israel border to launch terror attacks?

--What will the Obama Administration do if in practice Egypt tears up the Israel-Egypt peace treaty even if it pretends that it isn’t doing so?

--People are insisting that if Hamas in practice becomes part of the Palestinian Authority that the United States, and certainly Congress, will cut off aid. But what will happen when the Obama Administration does everything possible to prevent an aid cut-off and nothing possible to pressure the PA into changing its policy or behavior?

These are not speculations. These things WILL happen. Nobody in the United States or Europe is seriously discussing these scenarios and what should be done about them.

And I didn’t even mention the Egyptian presidential elections or, for that matter:

--An emboldened Turkish Islamist government if it wins the June 11 elections the:re,

--A Lebanese government controlled by Syria and its clients, especially Hizballah, if it ever gets a new prime minister and cabinet installed in that country.

--The survival of an anti-American Syrian government that has murdered hundreds of its citizens and will be arresting and torturing thousands, in part due to the Obama Administration's failure to try to overthrow it?

--The sight of Iran ever closer to nuclear weapons and admissions that the sanctions had only a limited effect?

These are not far-out scenarios. All of them have a 90 percent or more likelihood of happening.

I don’t want to take your time here for a history lesson but consider precedents:

--1952. Radical regime takes power in Egypt. U.S. realizes the threat by April 1955 but then saves the regime from being overthrown by Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. Result: Violence, disruption, and anti-American problems in the region for decades.

--1979. Radical regime takes power in Iran. U.S. policy makes a mess in dealing with the revolutionary crisis. Americans taken hostage, revolutionary Islamism flourishes, thirty plus years of violence, September 11, Islamist movement still growing. By the way, why does not one of the hundreds of "experts" on television and in the mass media remember that the Iranian revolution began after President Jimmy Carter urged reform on the shah and ended with the United States calling on the shah to go away? Remind you of anything?

September 2011 will be another of those moments. Mark that on your calendar. On the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the United States will be watching the triumph of the ideology and movement--not Usama bin Ladin, of course, but his smarter counterparts--in much of the Middle East.

PS: Here's an excellent guide to Egypt's political parties so far which proves my point . Note that there isn't a single serious moderate party. Amr Mousa isn't forming a party while Muhammad ElBaradei, Obama's favorite, isn't doing anything but complain. There is a "Facebook party." So far it has 1000 "likes." Egypt has about 85 million people.


Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/ His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is http://www.gloria-center.org. His PajamaMedia columns are mirrored and other articles available at http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/.

DESTINED TO FAIL: Obama's Vision of the Middle East

By Barry Rubin


To put it plainly, the press briefing supposed to indicate how President Barack Obama thinks about Israel on the eve of his trip here, is a combination of fantasy and insult. It is likely that the Obama Administration made such statements for show, to persuade the Arabic-speaking world that the United States is striving for peace, is not acting like a puppet (or should one say, ally?) of Israel and using its influence to change Israeli policy even as it does nothing of the sort.

As proof that Obama isn't going to do anything, he reportedly told Arab-American leaders before his trip that he wouldn't make some peace initiative because the government in Israel is not ready to make concessions and so there is no point in bringing pressure to bear at this time. I see that as a mixed statement. He isn't going to pressure Israel because he knows that to be a waste of time. That's good.

Yet the premises on which this argument--as repeated in the public briefing of the media--is based can also be described as believing that what the Arab public really wants is progress toward peace with Israel and that the United States sees the ball as being in Israel's--not the Arabs--court.

The other premise is a strange hint that Washington has suddenly realized what Israel has understood since the beginning--that the "Arab Spring" isn't going well. Now it feels the need to explain to Israeli leaders what they have long known, and give bad advice on what to do about it.

To show how mainstream Israelis who follow these issues closely see these themes, let's quote how the Ynet reporter who covered the briefing--the respected and nonpartisan Yitzhak Benhorin--summarized what Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said. Here’s his lead:

“U.S. President Barack Obama will not be bringing a peace plan to Israel, but he will try to convince Prime Minister Benjamin and the Israeli public that after the Arab Spring, Israel cannot depend on autocrats holding everything together in the region..”

Here’s a president arriving at a moment when Israelis think the region is falling apart, with old autocrats being replaced by new ones and a more hostile environment, and the message is: You shouldn’t be complacent so stop thinking that everything is great?

Where does this come from? It arises from the American conception that the “Arab Spring” is a great thing, that old autocrats are falling and will be replaced by more democratic and moderate regimes. That is American; not Israeli thinking.

If that theme is based on fantasy, the second theme is insulting. Here is the second paragraph of Benhorin’s analysis:

“The U.S. believes that Israel must show it is serious about its peace efforts. It must convince the general Arab public, if nothing more than to maintain Israel's peace treaty with Egypt.”

These are Benhorin’s words, not Rhodes’ exact formulations. But I think Benhorin reads the message properly.

Let’s begin by discussing the idea that Israel must persuade the Arab public:

--The question should be posed as this: When will the Arab public, or Arab governments, show Israel they are serious about peace? In 2009 when Obama sought such assurances and demonstrations he was turned down flat. We know it and he should know it.

--How long a list do you want of the times Israel has shown the Arab public that it wants peace seriously?

--Do you think the Arab public cares or is going to be persuaded by any such behavior?

--Hundreds of Israelis died in the 1993-2000 period in the effort to show the Arab public Israel was serious about peace.

The idea that Israel needs to persuade its neighbors to accept its existence is a line we have heard almost daily since the 1980s or even 1970s. Yet curiously the Arab street pays no attention to the scores of such Israeli gestures and the West soon forgets each one. And indeed Obama has forgotten those that took place during his first term, for example the nine-month-long settlement construction freeze, just as before that were forgotten the Oslo agreement, Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the 2000 Camp David offer (including the offer to redivide Jerusalem!) and many more. [See Footnote, below]

Guess what? If today Israel were to make a huge new concession, six months from now that would be forgotten in the West, which would also forget that there was no considerable Arab response. Israelis know this and so saying this kind of thing about Israel proving its decent intentions can only fall with a cynical thud. Such statements remind Israelis why they are NOT rushing to make new concessions or take new risks.

Note, too, that Western and European promises to give Israel a big reward if Israel takes a big risk or makes a big concession and the Arab side doesn't respond have also been repeatedly broken.

What Obama is in effect saying is “Mr. Netanyahu, tear down that [security, counterterrorist] wall.” When he should be saying to the other side: “Mr. Abbas, Mursi, et. al., tear down that wall of hatred against Israel!”

Of course, he won’t do so because that would make the Arab leaders and publics mad, not because they want Israel to move faster on peace or seek a better deal but because they don't want peace at all. And the Islamists coming into power have no intention of tearing down the wall. In fact, they are building it higher than ever. And there's nothing--absolutely nothing--Israel can do to change the course of events in that respect.

Moreover, in a context where the same point is not made loudly, clearly, and publicly to the Palestinian Authority, the idea that the burden is on Israel to prove its peace credentials is a veiled way of Obama saying--and signaling to his supporters--that Israel is responsible for the failure to achieve peace.

So on his visit Obama is not about to try to impose peace or even to press the issue. But why? The Obama Administration isn’t being honest about this. The reason is that the White House knows that such an effort will go nowhere. And it also not because of Netanyahu. After all, how well did six predecessors do in solving this problem? Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Tsipi Livni. Even if one can claim they all tried harder than Netanyahu why did they all fail?

While the ideas on the “peace process” show the problem with U.S. thinking on that issue, the idea on the direction being taken by the region shows the wider miasma of fantasy that surrounds U.S. policy.

This idea that Israel cannot depend on autocracies to maintain the status quo parallels Obama's view for U.S. policy: that to protect the region's stability, the United States must show its desire for good relations and the fulfillment of Arab and Muslim dreams by helping force out pro-American authoritarian regimes and to substitute for them (anti-American) Islamist authoritarian regimes.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not 1980. Does Israel not understand that the region is already overwhelmingly ruled by autocracies hostile to itself? Here is the list: Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran, in particular. And one can add Tunisia and Turkey where elections do mean something.

What does Obama intend to convey by this idea? It seems as if he is saying: You better act now while the relatively friendly dictator Bashar al-Assad is running Syria before the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists take power! But that is absurd. How about: You better act now before we pass the window of opportunity of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regime being eager for comprehensive peace with Israel? You better act fast before Hamas (which rules the Gaza Strip) and Hizballah (which rules Lebanon) change to a more hostile attitude?

What better time to make risky concessions than when the security situation is deteriorating and the new rulers of your neighbors are baying for your blood?

At any rate, the old autocrats are already gone for all practical purposes. The U.S. idea is an outdated one: Don't depend on being nice to Mubarak because one day he could be overthrown and there will come a pharaoh who knows not Joseph. Thanks, but that's already happened and you helped bring about that problem.

Thus, Israel must prove that it is a nice guy to...the Muslim Brotherhood? The nonsense involved is clear when the concept is stated plainly.

In Jewish history this concept translates, for example, into saying that the Jews shouldn't put all their eggs in the basket of the Weimar Republic because it had just been overthrown by the Nazis, so the Jews had to prove to them that they wanted good relations. (I apologize for the over-used Nazi reference but it is appropriate to explain the situation.)

The problem is that the United States is under the illusion that even the United States can make friends with Islamist regimes. How all-the-more ridiculous is it to claim that Israel can do so by concessions or gestures? How can anyone with a straight face suggest that if Israel shows progress on negotiations with the Palestinians that regimes which have sworn to wipe it off the map will change their minds?

Rhodes added that in particular progress on the peace process required that Israel show Egypt it should keep the peace treaty by making concessions to the Palestinians. Perhaps Egypt should keep the treaty because it is an international agreement it is required to keep. Or that it is in Egypt's interests because Israel and the United States would make Cairo sorry if it abandoned the treaty completely. Notice that only concessions--not toughness, deterrence, or credibility--are a tool to keep treaties.

In these circumstances, a phrase often comes to my mind: Just because you are stupid, why should I kill myself?

Yes, it is intemperate of me to call these people stupid but they leave me no choice. Who does the Egyptian government support among the Palestinians? Hamas, despite their recent bickering. So how would progress on negotiations with the Palestinian Authority soften Egypt’s attitude? Is President Mursi going to say: Wow, that treaty with Israel is worthwhile because there is hope of a deal with the Palestinians that will ensure a non-Islamist government in Palestine and help to guarantee the existence of a Zionist state in the region? Yay!

No. He would say that such progress would indicate a betrayal by the PA and make it harder for the Islamist cause to flourish. Hence, any such deal must be stopped. Mr. Rhodes, let me explain. It was Mubarak who perhaps benefited from an advancing peace process; Mursi hates the idea.

Rhodes continued:

“I think there’s an opportunity, frankly, for there to be a deeper source of support for peace broadly across the region if there can be progress."

I will give Rhodes the benefit of the doubt by suggesting that he does not believe one word of that sentence.

Again, Obama’s trip is not about this issue. Yet by keeping the mythology alive about the state of the conflict the Obama Administration does another disservice to Israeli interests and American understanding of the region.

Oh, and let’s not forget something else.

Rhodes didn’t say that the PA, whose leaders Obama will also meet, must show Israel that it’s serious about peace. Supposedly, making peace is a one-way street in which the burden is always on Israel. Yet Israel’s behavior is not due to stubbornness, paranoia, or ideology.

It is based on experience.

Footnotes: Of course I am aware that there have been circumstances in which specific Arab factors were responsive to Israeli concessions. To act Arab leaders--autocrats or otherwise--must believe they can get away with defying Islamists, who will declare anyone wanting to make peace with Israel as enemies of Allah. That was most obviously true of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Mursi's ideological compatriots killed Sadat. That graphically sums up who is on which side and why Rhodes', and hence the Obama Administration's, formulations are absurd.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Perhaps This “Arab Spring” Thing In Egypt Isn’t Working Out So Well

by Barry Rubin

Well, now at least the debate is in the open and we can see just how questionable are the talking points of those who claim the United States has nothing to fear from Islamists.

The New York Times publishes an article with the promising title of “Fast-Changing Arab World is Upending U.S. Assumptions,” yet sadly, the article shows that certain assumptions are not changing at all. Indeed, are not even discussed. To summarize the article’s thesis: before Obama’s election, the United States thought that pro-American regimes were good and radical Islamists were bad — but now we know better.

For decades, Obama’s predecessors supported a number of Arab governments, including those in Egypt and Tunisia but not Syria. Obama put the emphasis on engaging Syria, but did not directly challenge the Egyptian and Tunisian governments until uprisings began against them in January 2011. Then he threw those two under the bus as fast as possible. But that policy did not apply to anti-American Syria, which he abandoned only in August 2011 after four months of full-scale revolt and massacres far more intense than those which made it abandon the Egyptian and Tunisian governments during the first week of demonstrations.

What makes the effort to talk seriously about the Middle East nowadays so frustrating is that the “mainstream” debate, as illustrated by the Times article, devotes no space to suggesting the following: perhaps the rapid rise of Islamists might be bad for the United States, and the outbreak of violence from Salafist groups, two armed cross-border attacks on Israel, or other events suggest that the threat had been underestimated.

No, not at all. When talking with “experts,” and in the journalist’s own editorializing, the only theme is that the United States used to overestimate the Islamist threat, but now it knows better.


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Barry Rubin, Israel: An Introduction (Yale University Press) is the first comprehensive book providing a well-rounded introduction to Israel, a definitive account of the nation's past, its often controversial present, and much more. It presents a clear and detailed view of the country’s land, people, history, society, politics, economics, and culture. This book is written for general readers and students who may have little knowledge but even well-informed readers tell us they’ve learned new things.Please click on the picture of the book on the right column of this site to purchase and/or get more information on the book.
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I was fascinated by a remark by State Department spokesperson Victoria J. Nuland:

It’s a new day in Egypt. It’s a new day in a lot of countries across the Middle East and North Africa.

True, it is a new era but it is an era when radical Islamists are seizing power or threatening to seize power in lots of countries. That’s not a sunny good morning in the Middle East. In addition, Nuland’s is a very kind of American-style suggestion that whatever went before doesn’t matter. The history of these radical groups and their ideology is of no importance. We’re all starting over with a clean slate.

The Times journalist explains:

American officials did not always carefully distinguish between Islamists, who advocate a leading role for Islam in government, and violent jihadists, who espouse the same goal but advocate terrorism to achieve it.

To say that a group like the Muslim Brotherhood just advocates “a leading role for Islam in government” is not quite the point. The issue: what do they want to do with this “leading role”? Might they have some agenda after they give Islam a leading role in government, such as destroying women’s rights, oppressing Christians, attacking Israel, forcing the people to conform to the Islamists’ definition of Islam, and smashing U.S. interests?

It is the ability of leading mass media outlets to produce sentences like the following that drives me to despair:

American hostility to Islamist movements, in fact, long predated Sept. 11, in part because of the United States’ support for secular autocrats in Arab countries.

In other words, it is all America’s fault for not being sufficiently sensitive in comprehending the perspective of the Islamist movements. What about the other, unmentioned, part: the fact of the Islamist movements’ hostility to America, their support for terrorism, their blood-curdling expressions of anti-Semitic hatred, and their stated intention of repressing everybody else at home?

Two brief historical examples: A) In March 2002, the Muslim Brotherhood announced it had established an armed wing, eight of whose members were ready to be suicide bombers in attacking Israel. B) When an Islamist inspired by Brotherhood leaders’ call for his murder tried to assassinate Egypt’s Nobel prize-winning author Naguib Mahfouz, a top Brotherhood official testified in the terrorist’s defense that he was right to try to murder the aged author.

So is there any risk from the rise of revolutionary Islamists today? Absolutely not, explains the Times writer. According to him:

[Experts] suggest that Americans should not assume that the rise of Islamists puts the United States in greater danger from terrorists. The opposite may well be the case, they say.

More recently, of course, we have the formation of Salafist morality squads, attacks on churches, and the extremely radical rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential campaign when all the niqabs were lifted to show the ferocious hatreds and extremism underneath.

Then the article quotes two experts. One explains that the revolution in Egypt “is an important step in combating terrorism in the region and undermining its appeal.” The other says that Egyptian terrorists were just mad about the Mubarak dictatorship so they have no remaining motive to use violence. But “If Islamist groups like the Brotherhood lose faith in democracy, that’s when there could be dire consequences.”

How do we prevent the Brotherhood from losing faith in democracy? Simple. Turn all the power over to them. Then presumably having their faith in democracy proven, they don’t actually need to kill anyone outside the country or repress anyone within the country.

To add insult to injury the author cites a supposed reason proving there is no problem with revolutionary Islamists taking power:

An earlier precedent might be the Zionist militants who took part in terrorist acts against the British before the creation of the State of Israel, then became leading politicians who were warmly welcomed in Washington.

I’m thinking of holding a contest so that you can explain why this “precedent” doesn’t hold. Once the state of Israel was established, those “Zionist militants” had no further demands. They didn’t want to fundamentally transform the country using mass repression nor did they have any active demands internationally. Certainly, they didn’t seek to wipe Britain off the map and if anything they were pro-American.

The mind that can make such a comparison is incapable of comprehending international affairs.

So here we are in the middle of 2012, and all of the events of the last eighteen months don’t seem to have taught the current administration’s policymakers or its supportive scribes anything. Can’t they even consider: “Hmm, perhaps this “Arab Spring” thing isn’t working out so well … “, or, “Maybe the rapid rise of revolutionary Islamist movements is just a little bit scary. Maybe we should be cautious about promoting it”? Can’t they?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

The New Middle East: Arab Versus Non-Arab Muslims; Sunni Versus Shia

By Barry Rubin

The new Middle East strategic battle is heating up and this is only the start. It has nothing to do with Israel and everything to do with two more serious lines of battle: Arabs versus Persians and Sunni versus Shia Muslims.

The Arab-Israeli or Israel-Palestinian dispute is increasingly unimportant, despite the hatred of increasingly powerful Islamist forces for Israel. The real struggle is over who will control each Muslim majority country and who is going to lead the Middle East. Both issues have almost nothing to do with Israel. At the same time, Israel has virtually no role to play in these struggles, except to ensure that Hamas doesn’t take over the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority.

The Sunni Arab position was stated very clearly by Amr Moussa, a veteran Arab nationalist and candidate for Egypt’s presidency: "[The] Arab Middle East will not be run by Iran or Turkey." Note that he didn’t even mention Israel, in sharp contrast to how the issue would have been defined in previous decades: as a Zionist threat to rule the entire region.


Iran is Persian-ruled (though only about half the population is ethnic Persian) and Shia Muslim. Turkey is ruled by ethnic Turks even though it is predominantly Sunni Muslim.

What we are seeing again, for the first time in three decades—since President Anwar al-Sadat put the priority on a domestic focus, peace with Israel, and alliance with the United States--is an Egyptian bid to lead the Arabic-speaking world and even the whole region. On this point, Egyptian leftists, nationalists, and Islamists are united. And in the first round, the battle over control of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, Egypt won and Iran lost.

Note that this has nothing to do with the current military rulers of Egypt who will be out of power before the end of June. This is a long-term struggle led by the civilian, primarily Islamist, politicians. And it is a program over which the Islamists can unite the country behind them in a wave of patriotic, Arab, and Sunni zeal. Building on this agenda, often used demagogically, also requires Cairo to distance itself from the United States.

Here’s another point to keep in mind. The head of the Egyptian parliament’s foreign affairs committee is now Essam al-Arian, one of the most outspokenly radical Muslim Brotherhood leaders. He’s outspokenly in favor of destroying Israel and U.S. interests in the region. This is one more of an endless amount of evidence about the Brotherhood’s extremism and the coming
collision with Washington.



At the same time, al-Arian is strongly anti-Iran, predicting the overthrow of the Tehran regime in an internal revolution. When a Muslim Brotherhood says such a thing that isn’t an example of political analysis but of advocacy.


In another example of Brotherhood, and Egyptian, hostility to the Iran-led bloc, Egypt has pulled Hamas into its orbit. The Brotherhood supports its Syrian brothers in their revolution against the pro-Iran regime in Damascus. It also backs the Bahrain government against Shia oppositionists there and is hostile to Hizballah in Lebanon.



And so despite the fact that Iran has now offered Egypt financial aid, which that country needs, the Egyptians are ignoring the proposal. They do not want to be beholden to Tehran any more than they would be to the United States.


It has not yet been widely recognized that the last year has been a disaster for Iran’s strategy of gaining regional leadership. Outside of Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq—where Tehran is backing forces which aren’t doing so well at present—only in Lebanon does Iran still have real influence. Its potential appeal is now limited to the Shia Muslims, who are minorities everywhere except in Bahrain and Iraq.


Two years ago, an Iranian nuclear bomb would have sparked a wave of pro-Iran reaction throughout the Middle East, now it will have little effect on (Sunni, Arab) public opinion. Similarly, two years ago threats to wipe Israel off the map made Iran more popular while hostility toward Israel did the same for Turkey. Now such ranting does nothing to promote Iran's or Turkey's regional influence.


For Turkey, too, the “Arab Spring” ended that Islamist regime’s regional ambitions. Nobody needs the Turks as regional leaders. Indeed, efforts to claim such a role have created intense resentment in both Egypt and Iran.


In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood has expanded its influence to a remarkable extent. Aside from probably ruling Egypt, the Brotherhood can now claim the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, and Libya as being within its sphere of influence. And it is also the patron of the Brotherhood branches in Syria and Jordan.


Another result of this process is the orphaning of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has no foreign patron whatsoever. Iran, Egypt, and Syria back Hamas. The PA’s patron should be wealthy Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Yet it has never won back their support after the rupture caused when PA leader Yasir Arafat backed Iraq’s takeover of Kuwait in 1990-1991.


A weakened PA has no maneuvering room except to protect its militant credentials by refusing to negotiate or compromise with Israel while talking in a radical manner. The Israel-Palestinian peace process has in fact been dead since 2000 but only now is most of the world acknowledging the obituary.


This is the new Middle East, quite different from the region as understood for the last sixty years. The battle for predominance among the three strong Arab nationalist regimes—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—has now given way between Sunni and Shia blocs. Increasingly, Arab assessments of threats from Egypt in the west to the Persian Gulf on the eastern end barely mention Israel at all.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Navigating The New Middle East? The Obama Administration Is Lost At Sea And On The Rocks

By Barry Rubin

This article surveys all aspects of U.S. Middle East policy under the Obama administration, critiques this strategy and premises, and suggests what U.S. policy should

The Obama administration has comprehensively lost its way on Middle East policy to an extent that poses tremendous dangers to the United States, Western interests, and the region as a whole. The cost of these mistakes will be–and already has been–serious losses, crises, and violent conflicts. People in the area will pay heavily in blood and suffering due to these miscomprehensions and miscalculations.

Despite these obvious problems, the mass media and academic experts have tended to ignore, misunderstand, or apologize for them. This failure of critical institutions to fulfill their watch-dog and evaluation tasks has worsened the situation, since corrections have not been made and honest debates have not taken place. Nothing illustrates the depth and extent of the problem more than a balanced survey. Consequently, this article presents three aspects of contemporary U.S. Middle East policy and the problems it faces. The first section provides the basic premises of the situation under the Obama administration. The second section discusses what its strategy should be. The third section looks at the various current issues with brief discussions on the gap between actual policy and preferable policy.



THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE EAST[1]


To an extent greater than any modern predecessor, the Obama administration has abandoned traditional diplomatic and international affairs concepts. This does not mean that they have been abandoned completely or that there is no continuity on Middle East policy, but the basic change has been greater than in the past. In particular, ideas such as realpolitik, power politics, leverage, rewarding allies and punishing enemies, credibility, and deterrence have been questioned or undermined. While the onset of the “Arab Spring” starting in January 2011 altered administration policy from the original framework in favor of reform and democratization–though, as shall be seen, not always–the same basic pattern continued. Some of the administration’s “new thinking” attitudes are discussed as follows.

First, is the importance of popularity. While wanting to be liked by other countries and their people is something of a theme in U.S. foreign policy history–in sharp contrast to almost every other government in the world–it has never become as high a priority as in the Obama administration. The desire to be popular has shaped administration policies. That Obama had made the United States popular again was one of the administration’s main claimed successes–though reliable polls did not necessarily show this to be true. To be popular, of course, required avoiding confrontations with others (even at times when there were conflicting interests) and showing special sensitivity (at times pandering) to what others wanted to hear. This was a perceived contrast with the preceding Bush administration, which was seen as making America especially disliked.

Together with popularity was the idea that the administration must get along with Islam. The interpretation was that being liked required a hypersensitivity toward Islam, going beyond the strong effort at carefulness followed by the preceding president in the wake of the September 11 attacks. While it was not noticed, there was far less emphasis on getting along with Arab nationalism. The president’s unique personal experience and sympathy with Islam was a partial factor in this orientation, seen in his Cairo and Istanbul speeches, his banning of anything that even seemed to hint at a problem with radical political Islamism, and such symbolic gestures as ordering the head of NASA to focus on appreciating (that is, largely forging) some great Muslim contribution to space exploration.

The next policy adjustment was the redefinition of the Middle East in Islamic terms. This is a revolutionary, albeit virtually unnoticed, change and was the core idea of Obama’s June 2009 Cairo speech. Since the 1950s, the Arabic-speaking world’s politics functioned largely within the framework of Arab nationalism. Western policies dealt with the area in those terms. Yet Obama’s “Islamic” approach undermined that. This would become tremendously important with the development of the “Arab Spring,” when Arab nationalist regimes and identity clashed with Islamist identity and opposition movements.

Another new attitude has been the administration’s very specific view of terrorism and the threat to U.S. interests. According to the Obama administration concept, al-Qa’ida is a dangerous enemy because it attacked the United States directly. However, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and even the Taliban (it allegedly has a moderate wing with which the United States is negotiating) can be moderated and rendered non-hostile to the United States. If not for pressure from pro-Israel forces, the administration would probably extend this to Hamas (a position that Obama’s terrorism advisor, John Brennan, has stated privately). Thus, there is no war on terrorism (since only a small portion of terrorism is hostile and dangerous) and there is no war on revolutionary Islamism (since that might offend Muslims and many Islamists can be managed) but only a war on al-Qa’ida.

The Obama administration has also shifted its emphasis to reconciling enemies rather than supporting friends. Believing in the importance of popularity, the potential moderation of Islamists, the avoidance of conflict, the priority on conciliating Islam, etc., the administration has put the emphasis on winning over enemies. The Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Syria are to be engaged. Compromise is possible with the Taliban (or part of it). No criticism is to be made of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the Islamist-oriented Turkish regime.

At the same time, the concerns not only of Israel but also traditional Arab allies–former President Husni Mubarak’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and smaller Gulf Arab monarchies–have been neglected. These factors are not fully consulted and the Obama administration quickly backed Mubarak’s downfall. Similarly, while showing great consideration for the Egyptian and Tunisian oppositions that were challenging pro-U.S. governments, the Obama administration gave little help or even verbal support to the oppositions in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Turkey, which opposed anti-American governments.

Further, the administration has been downplaying American leadership. It very explicitly criticized U.S. policy in the past as being insensitive, imperialistic, and bullying while expressing a desire to be merely an equal partner. It placed more dependence on the choices of allies, the UN, and even the Arab League (notably on the Libya issue).

In addition, while other administrations criticized Israel and supported the Palestinians, the Obama administration went further in trying to distance itself from Israel in public perception. This situation should not be exaggerated. U.S.-Israel relations continued to function well on the military level, and there was no real pressure applied. Yet that is the point: the Obama administration wanted to be seen as further away from Israel and more supportive of the Palestinians as part of its strategy intended to win support from Muslims and Arabs.

Similarly, the Obama administration was not unique in its highlighting of Israel-Palestinian issues and putting a priority on the “peace process.” What made the administration different from its predecessors is that it continued this orientation even after failures might have been expected to make it change priorities. Thus, it seemed as if its attitude on the issue had a stronger aspect of ideological preconception rather than a pragmatic belief that progress could be realistically expected.

—The last element of the Obama strategy is the belief that change must be good and democracy inevitably triumphant. Similar to its domestic worldview, the Obama administration enthusiastically embraced the “Arab Spring,” clearly arguing that nothing could go wrong and that a revolutionary Islamist “hijacking” of these events and takeover of power was not possible. Ironically, this was a caricature of the Bush policy that Obama’s supporters had ridiculed.

All of these ideas are wrong, dangerous, and likely to lead to defeats for the United States, the weakening of its allies, the strengthening of its enemies, and the spawning of future crises.



WHAT SHOULD THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION BE DOING?

To understand what U.S. policy should be, it is necessary to understand the current reality of the Middle East. The central issue is the struggle of revolutionary Islamists to seize control of individual countries and the region as a whole. They are seeking to overthrow existing governments, fundamentally transform those societies, wipe Israel off the map, and expel Western–and especially U.S.–influence from the region.[2] This is, to say the least, a critical challenge. Yet it is a threat that the Obama administration does not even recognize. The Islamist forces are not united and there are three basic groupings.

First are al-Qa’ida and its constituent groups organized in a loose umbrella, to mix a metaphor. This bloc can cause serious trouble and kill people, but its dependence on a single tactic, terrorism, also makes it much weaker than Islamist forces that are strategically wise and tactically flexible. Al-Qa’ida can blow things up, but it cannot seize state power. Consequently, this bloc that the Obama administration has focused on as the main threat is by far the least dangerous.

The second Islamist force is the Iran-led bloc. This consists of Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Iraqi insurgents. The Turkish regime has aligned with this group as well. It came into control of Lebanon too.

Last, is a possible Muslim Brotherhood bloc. The “Arab Spring,” however, strengthened Sunni Islamists, especially in Egypt and Syria while to a lesser extent in Libya and Tunisia. Consequently, a new Muslim Brotherhood bloc has emerged to some extent and has been attractive for both Hamas and Turkey. It is still far behind the Iran-led bloc, but a measure of power in Egypt would promote its interests greatly. If it can align many Sunni Islamists behind it in opposition to Shi’a, the Iran-led bloc could be circumscribed and lose some of its appeal.

There should be no illusion, however, that the problem is “only” al-Qa’ida or that radical Islamist elements from any grouping could be won over. They are all anti-American and anti-Western due both to their ideology and interests. When Islamists and radicals complained, for example, about U.S. support for the Mubarak regime, they were not decrying a lack of democracy but how Washington was blocking their own revolutionary success.

To meet this threat, the U.S. course should be clear. What is needed is American leadership of a broad and loose coalition opposing the spread of revolutionary Islamist power and rule. Such a non-institutionalized alignment would consist of the United States and Canada, European democracies, relatively moderate Arab states, and Israel. In terms of cooperation, it would also include opposition movements opposing radical regimes, notably in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Eventually, it might also work with democratic forces horrified by growing Islamist power in their countries, notably in Egypt and Tunisia.

In order to provide such leadership, the U.S. government would have to have a clear view of friends and enemies, understand the revolutionary Islamist ideology and methods, maintain its credibility, and reward friends while punishing enemies. Unfortunately, this approach is virtually the opposite of the Obama administration’s policies, which have in fact undermined what is required for success. Without making any actual strategic gain, U.S. interests have suffered four serious defeats during the first half of the Obama administration:

First, was the loss of Egypt as America’s main Arab ally and its possible turn toward the other side. Second, was the consolidation of Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip, now further fortified with its growing status as an Egyptian protectorate. The third factor was Lebanon’s takeover by a Hizballah-led government that looks to Syria and Iran as patrons. Last, was the virtual defection of Turkey, governed by an Islamist regime, to the other side.

Not all of these are completely Obama’s fault, but he bears a large measure of the responsibility. Moreover, potential gains–represented by revolts in Iran and Syria–were given no support by Washington. Additional secondary losses could also be listed.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict, which so often is put at the center of the region (and even crowds out every other issue in the consciousness of policymakers, “experts,” and the mass media), is of minimal importance in all this. One could provide a blow-by-blow description of the administration’s flailing about on this issue, but it is not really worthwhile. In the end, despite the sound and fury involved, the “peace process” diplomacy changed little and signified nothing.

THE SPECIFIC ISSUES AND CHALLENGES AT STAKE

The shortcomings of the Obama administration’s policy emerge with startling clarity when one inventories precisely what has happened and how it has managed these challenges. These are presented in alphabetical order:


Afghanistan

The U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan was based on the erroneous belief that American military forces could help create a stable and developing democratic polity in that country. After an overly long decisionmaking process, Obama opted for withdrawing U.S. forces while seeking a deal with the “moderate wing” of the Taliban. The problem is that a war in Afghanistan is unwinnable; that the Taliban will not disappear and is already going on the offensive in anticipation of U.S. withdrawal; Pakistan is a thoroughly unreliable ally; and the Afghan government is a mess. The Obama administration might get credit for withdrawing U.S. forces, but the situation in Afghanistan will be a disaster. Clear anarchy at best, and a Taliban reconquest at worst, will not make the Obama administration’s Afghan policy look so good in future.

Egypt

The situation in Egypt is arguably the greatest single setback to U.S. interests since Iran’s 1979 Revolution. In the first phase, the Obama administration strongly supported the overthrow of the long-allied Mubarak regime, trading this for an uncertain future. Thus, it lost the best U.S. partner in the Arabic-speaking world, a government that opposed revolutionary Islamism in general (and especially Hamas) along with Iranian ambitions.

The second phase seems likely to produce an anti-American government of fixed Islamist and radical nationalist views that is unlikely to support U.S. goals, likely to empty of content the Egypt-Israel peace (and conceivably go to war with Israel), and probably to become itself a supporter of anti-American and revolutionary Islamist forces in the region. It is difficult to conceive of a more total setback, yet the most basic points of the above analysis remain generally unrecognized in Washington.


Iran

After a long effort at engagement, which wasted time, the administration did finally support strong sanctions on Tehran in late 2010. The problem is that a number of loopholes were built in, which essentially excused China, Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates from having to implement the sanctions in practice. Moreover, while the administration was ostensibly tough on Iran’s nuclear program, it did not even seem to recognize Iran’s strategic threat. That is, little was done to oppose the expansion of Iranian influence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, or elsewhere. The principal Iranian challenge is through the use of backing revolutionary Islamist groups, covert warfare, funding, propaganda, and sponsoring terrorism–all elements to which the Obama administration has no serious response.

The Obama administration’s concept of “containing” Iran almost exclusively focuses on preventing Iran from using nuclear weapons, a worthwhile endeavor but far from the entire picture. Moreover, despite some escalation of verbiage, the administration made no systematic effort to support the Iranian opposition. Thus, Iran’s expanding power and influence was scarcely troubled by administration policy.


Iraq

Although the Obama administration’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq makes sense on its own terms, in the context of a perceived weakening of American resolve and failure to confront Iran and other radical forces, it contributes to a sense in the region that–for allies–America is not reliable and–for enemies–that it is highly vulnerable. The Iraqi government is faction-ridden and plagued with internal problems. This, of course, is not the Obama administration’s fault, but it makes the future of U.S.-Iraqi relations most insecure. While Iranian influence will not easily gain hegemony there, it is a serious competitor for the United States, especially if Iran seems to be the winning side in Gulf regional terms.


Israel

The best way to characterize U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency is as relatively unchanged in material terms but very much undermined in terms of mutual trust and strategic cooperation. In other words, the bilateral military relationship has continued with little alteration and after all the storm and fury of administration rhetoric, there has been no real pressure on Israel or withdrawal of basic support. Still, the administration’s obvious eagerness to distance itself from Israel and its lack of understanding of that country’s needs reduce confidence in U.S. reliability. Specific mistaken U.S. policies have made Israeli leaders wary of trusting Obama, taking risks, or making concessions at his behest.

Ironically, Obama himself has been the greatest saboteur of an already stricken “peace process.” His mistaken initial focus on the stopping of all construction on settlements, his refusal to criticize or pressure the Palestinian Authority, his ill-fated call for quick negotiations in the fall of 2009, and many other actions eliminated any possibility for negotiations. The truth is that Obama and his White House team have little understanding of the issues involved and none at all of Israeli interests and motivations. The administration made the greatest mistakes on these issues not only by having bad policies but in having policies that were so visibly mistaken and failed.


Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip is one of the administration’s greatest failures, though not one of the better understood ones. The policy of Israel, Egypt, and the Bush administration was to maintain pressure on the Gaza Strip to ensure that the Hamas regime remained weak and unstable, and thus less able to launch war on Israel or spread revolutionary Islamism. In addition, the idea was that a gap between a prosperous PA-ruled West Bank and a relatively impoverished Gaza Strip would increase popular support for the PA and decrease support for Hamas in both places.

The Obama administration trampled on this strategy. After the first Gaza flotilla, the administration could have done nothing. Instead, it handed the flotilla (and Hamas) a victory while getting nothing in exchange, by pressuring Israel to reduce sanctions on the Gaza Strip to a minimum. Then it paid hundreds of millions of dollars to the PA for use in subsidizing former PA employees in Gaza, an understandable step but a damaging one. Finally, by helping to bring down the Mubarak government, the White House guaranteed a pro-Hamas regime in Cairo and a virtually open border for shipping in weapons, money, and terrorists. By this behavior, the administration laid the foundation for a future Hamas-Israel, and possibly Egypt-Hamas versus Israel, war.


Lebanon

The deterioration of the political situation in Lebanon was not helped by the policy of the Bush administration in its latter years. Obama, however, made the situation much worse. Rather than back the moderate Sunni-Christian-Druze coalition, the administration followed a policy based on both non-intervention and a pro-Syrian stance. Despite some occasional statements, the U.S. government did nothing to stem a Hizballah-led, Syrian- and Iranian-backed takeover of the Beirut government.

The lack of U.S. support demoralized the moderate forces, while the openness of the U.S. government to Hizballah’s empowerment was also most damaging. During Obama’s watch, Lebanon has changed over to the anti-American, pro-Islamist bloc camp. Again, the administration does not even seem to comprehend the seriousness of the defeat there.


Libya
As with several other aspects of Obama administration policy, its dealings with Libya are close to being beyond belief. Frightened by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Libyan dictator Mu’amar Qadhafi was “scared straight,” abandoned his nuclear program, and behaved himself internationally. Of course, there is no doubt that Qadhafi was a terrible dictator, yet the U.S. decision to back an unknown opposition in a civil war with NATO forces seemed precipitate to say the least. The fact that it was explicitly based on “protecting civilians,” rather than on U.S. interests, was obviously arbitrary in terms of Middle East situations where this principle could have been better applied elsewhere.

Regarding Libya, the Obama administration made every mistake that its leaders and supporters had spent years criticizing when done by previous governments: a military intervention that had not been thought through, overstretching U.S. forces, and putting U.S. prestige into the hands of a questionable ally.



Muslim Brotherhood

One of the many remarkable shortcomings of Obama policy is its inability to figure out that the Muslim Brotherhood is an anti-American, revolutionary Islamist group that wants to wipe Israel off the map and transform Egypt into an Islamist state. To reach that conclusion did not seem the most difficult of tasks. Yet high administration officials asserted that the Brotherhood was moderate, nonviolent, non-Islamist, and even secular.

Before anyone even asked for his opinion, Obama declared early on in the revolution that the United States had no problem seeing the Brotherhood in government. In short, the administration took a major gamble on little intelligence that either the Brotherhood would not win elections or that if it did gain power, the group would be moderate. This could well turn out to be one of the greatest miscalculations in U.S. diplomatic history.


Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority was discussed earlier under the Gaza Strip and Israel categories, but it should be added that the administration seemed totally incapable of dealing with PA intransigence. In fact, the White House intensified the problem. The PA refused to negotiate with Israel, rejected Obama’s public call for talks in late 2009, wasted the nine-month Israeli freeze on construction, broke its promise to Obama not to push for UN adoption of the Goldstone Report on Gaza, made a partnership deal with Hamas, and abandoned all of its previous commitments in order to push for unilateral independence without any prior deal with Israel. Yet none of these actions had the slightest effect on the administration’s virtually uncritical support for the PA.


Saudi Arabia

While Saudi Arabia is not an ideal society, it certainly has been an important U.S. ally for many years. The Obama administration virtually rubbed the monarchy’s face in the dirt–provoking the biggest rift in many years–and hardly noticed that it was doing anything to create a problem. It did not back Saudi efforts to keep Lebanon from becoming a Syria-Iran satellite. Then it did not consult the Saudis over Egypt.

Indeed, from the tone of U.S. rhetoric, one might have concluded that the White House backed the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. As if that were not enough the U.S. government did not make the Saudis feel that it was going to protect them from Iran. Finally, it at first advocated the overthrow of Bahrain’s government, whose shortcomings in the treatment of the Shi’a majority did not outweigh the dangers of the country coming under the rule of an Iranian client regime. As a result, the Saudis–and the smaller Gulf states that had similar perceptions–intervened in Bahrain themselves; tried to develop their own ability to counter Iran; and drew another neglected and endangered moderate state, Jordan, under the protection of the Gulf Cooperation Council.


Syria

Even in a list of remarkably bad policies, the Obama administration’s approach to Syria stands out as especially misconceived. The idea that the United States would pull Syria away from Iran (a patron that backed its ambitions, lavishly subsidized Syria and Syria’s clients, and provided it with both religious cover and strategic protection) was simply ludicrous, as if the Tehran regime had embarked on a high-priority effort to turn the United Kingdom or Canada from being U.S. allies to partners with Iran. Equally misconceived was the belief that the United States could moderate the most radical and anti-American of contemporary Arab regimes, which has behaved in that way because such a posture well served the regime’s interests.

The Obama administration thus undid many of the Bush era sanctions while ignoring Syria’s help to terrorists killing Americans in Iraq, backing for Hamas and Hizballah, efforts to seize control over Lebanon, sabotaging of the peace process, and other actions. Then, when the Syrian people revolted against the regime–at a time when the Obama administration had proclaimed a policy of promoting change and democracy–the U.S. government gave Syria an exemption and continued to support the dictatorship. It would be hard to imagine a policy more totally opposed to U.S. interests and sheer common sense.

Turkey

As in other cases, regarding Turkey, the Obama administration failed to perceive a major shift and thus developed a policy totally out of sync with the situation and contrary to U.S. interests. The Turkish regime, whatever the cleverness of its tactics and the patience of its progression, is an Islamist one. That government moved into alignment with Syria (at least before that country’s upheaval) and Iran, while backing Hamas and Hizballah, and becoming passionately anti-Israel.

That regime also acted contrary to U.S. policy on a number of issues, noticeably trying to sabotage the U.S. sanctions effort against Iran. It also steadily diminished freedom of speech within Turkey and arrested many critics. Yet despite some mention of the human rights issue, by mid-2011, the Obama administration acted as if nothing had changed and that Turkey was still a stalwart ally with no real problems in the relationship.

As the Turkish government whipped up anti-American fervor (and it is known–thanks to Wikileaks–that the U.S. embassy in Ankara was sending warnings to Washington), the U.S. government continued to be blithely ignorant about the danger. The administration constantly praised the Turkish regime–even holding it up as a model for Arabic-speaking states. This, of course, made the Turkish opposition feel betrayed and public opinion conclude that there was no cost for sticking a finger into America’s eye.

WHAT HATH OBAMA WROUGHT?

To say that Obama policy in the Middle East has been disastrous is not a partisan or ideological statement but merely a recounting of the facts. The damage to U.S. interests and regional stability are perilous indeed and will take years to reverse–if in fact it can be reversed. Yet to focus on U.S.-Israel relations or on U.S. policy and the Israel-Palestinian conflict is to miss the main point. For all the drama and passion expended on those issues, they are essentially a sideshow. The real problem is the decline in the U.S. strategic position in the region, the failure to address the great conflict taking place in the region, the self-inflicted reduction of U.S. credibility and leverage, and even actions that have strengthened America’s enemies.

None of the points made in this article are unknown in the Middle East. On the contrary, all of them are well understood both by America’s worried friends and by its emboldened enemies. Of equal importance is the failure of the Obama administration to learn from its mistakes and experiences.

While many career officials in the State and Defense departments are aware of the mistaken conception and strategy, they are unable to affect policy except at the margins. The Defense Department and military commanders are forced to fight three wars simultaneously based on a strategy set by the White House, despite many misgivings. When Robert Gates was secretary of defense, until July 2011, he made clear his discontent with several aspects of policy–notably the Libyan war. His replacement by a politician close to Obama, Leon Panetta, removed that impediment to White House strategy.

Hillary Clinton, as secretary of state, also disagreed with aspects of Obama’s policy and was seconded by career Middle East experts in the department. On two issues–White House support for the overturn of the governments in Bahrain and Egypt–the State Department and the president came into open disagreement. On Egypt, the State Department lost; on Bahrain it won after convincing the president that a revolution would increase Iranian influence and might lead to the closure of the U.S. naval base there.

The secretary of state is the president’s former chief political rival and her own views have been repeatedly dismissed, thus making her into a cynical transmission belt for Obama’s own views. Although much of State Department embassy reporting has been good, its points–for example, the threat from the Turkish regime–do not penetrate into the highest levels. Consequently, there is no place in the policy process from which corrective ideas can come.

Moreover, Obama’s top tier of national security advisors on policy is extremely weak, further undermining a president with little knowledge of international affairs or the Middle East. The national security advisor is a political operative with no real authority or informed views. The first secretary of defense was a holdover from the Bush administration and did not enjoy the president’s confidence, while his replacement is a former congressman with little knowledge of military or strategic affairs (except, perhaps, on budgetary issues).



Aside from Obama himself–who lacks experience on war-making, national administration, international affairs, and the Middle East–those who played the main role in policymaking were relatively junior staffers at the National Security Council. These individuals had little experience or knowledge in the region but deep-seated ideological premises based on theory and academic backgrounds. In contrast to some previous administrations, there was no strong national security advisor to advise the president and affect his views. Another important factor in shaping policy was the CIA, which advocated the view that only al-Qa’ida was a real threat and that dialogue with revolutionary Islamists was the correct approach, even before Obama’s election. This view was also embodied in John Brennan, the president’s advisor on terrorism, who was outspoken in his belief that befriending Islamists would moderate them.

A more detailed picture, of course, will have to await the availability of first-person memoirs on policymaking from inside the administration. Nevertheless, it is already apparent that four more years of the same policy is not something one wants to contemplate. A number of crisis scenarios based on the developments presented above would pose tremendous challenges to an administration ill-equipped by both ability and worldview to handle them.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and Middle East editor and a featured columnist at PajamasMedia http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/. His latest books include Israel: An Introduction (Yale, 2012); The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).


NOTES



[1] This section is based on a thorough reading of statements by President Barack Obama and administration officials as well as documents and actions. Many examples are provided by the current author’s writings during the period since the administration took office.

[2] This author anticipated the challenges and responses of the Obama Administration in an article written just as he was taking office. More than two years later, this analysis looks quite accurate on both counts. See Barry Rubin, “U.S. Middle East Policy: Too Many Challenges and yet a Single Theme,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, June 2009, http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/06/rubin-2009-06-03/.